“JD Vance says the Iran war could enter a very different phase after the midterms. But what exactly could change — and does that mean the fighting could finally ease? Full details are in the comments.”

JD Vance Says the Iran War Is Entering a “Much Different Phase” - But the Path Out Remains Unclear

The vice president says the first stage of the U.S. campaign is over and a new phase could emerge within months. Yet the Strait of Hormuz remains heavily disrupted, the June ceasefire framework has broken down, and a new CBO estimate puts direct Pentagon costs at about $38 billion through August 1.

Vice President JD Vance is signaling that the United States may be approaching another turning point in its war with Iran, but the administration has not publicly defined what that transition would look like or what conditions would have to be met for the conflict to end. His comments come as the war enters its seventh month, U.S. military costs continue to rise and commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains far below prewar levels.

In an interview with the New York Post aboard Air Force Two on September 14, Vance divided the conflict into two stages. He said the first phase was aimed at severely degrading Iran's nuclear, conventional military and regional power-projection capabilities. The second, he said, is focused on preventing Tehran from rebuilding those capabilities while trying to restore a measure of regional stability.

There are really two phases to this thing, and the first phase is done, Vance said. He later added that the conflict could enter a “much different phase in a couple of months.” The formulation was notable because it echoed President Donald Trump's recent suggestion that the war could wind down after the November 3 midterm elections, while stopping short of describing a negotiated settlement, a military off-ramp or a timetable tied to specific Iranian actions.

The administration's description of phase one is also a statement of its own assessment rather than an uncontested conclusion. U.S. and Israeli strikes have inflicted heavy damage on Iran's conventional forces, missile infrastructure and military facilities. But the status of Iran's nuclear program remains difficult to verify. The International Atomic Energy Agency has continued to press Tehran for access and information about enriched uranium, and earlier IAEA reporting found that the war had not resolved longstanding uncertainty over Iran's nuclear stockpiles. Iran maintains that its nuclear program is peaceful.

Vance's second phase therefore begins with an unresolved strategic problem: the United States says Iran must not be allowed to rebuild military and nuclear capabilities Washington considers threatening, but preventing reconstruction can require sustained surveillance, sanctions, maritime pressure, diplomacy and, potentially, additional strikes. The administration has not publicly said where it would draw the line between deterrence and renewed large-scale combat.

Vance sought to portray the current U.S. posture as less aggressive than the opening months of the war. He said American forces are “not engaged in aggressive operations,” while acknowledging that Iran continues to fire intermittently at commercial shipping. That description reflects a reduction from the intense initial campaign, but it does not mean military confrontation has ended.

The clearest evidence is in and around the Strait of Hormuz. On September 15, the U.S. military said it destroyed two small Iranian boats after they attempted to take possession of a U.S. unmanned surface vessel. Iran's state media described the vessels as fishing boats and did not acknowledge an attempted seizure. The incident followed Iran's capture earlier in the month of a malfunctioning U.S. underwater drone near the entrance to the strait.

Those encounters underscore how different the present phase is from a conventional ceasefire. The United States is still conducting maritime security operations, mine-clearing and enforcement activity. Iran still retains the ability to threaten vessels and create risk for shipping. The result is a waterway that is neither fully closed nor remotely back to normal.

Reuters shipping data showed only four recorded vessel transits through Hormuz on September 15, down from seven the previous day and far below the 10-day average of 18. Before the war, approximately 125 to 140 ships typically crossed the strait each day. The passage normally handles about one-fifth of the world's oil and liquefied natural gas supply, making even partial disruption economically significant far beyond the Gulf.

The public shipping numbers require an important caveat. Some vessels are moving through the region with tracking transponders turned off, and U.S.-escorted or so-called dark transits are not always captured by commercial tracking services. Vance has said traffic has recovered to more than half of normal levels, a figure that appears to include movements not visible in the public data. Publicly tracked crossings, however, remain dramatically below the prewar baseline.

That gap between official claims of improvement and visible commercial traffic is one of the central uncertainties in assessing the administration's second phase. From a military perspective, the United States may judge that Iran has lost much of its ability to control the waterway. From the perspective of insurers, shipping companies and energy traders, the key test is whether ships can move predictably and at scale without unacceptable risk. By that measure, normality has not returned.

The economic cost of the war has also become more concrete. On September 15, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office estimated that Defense Department operations against Iran had cost approximately $38 billion through August 1. The figure includes the cost of replacing expended munitions and equipment lost in battle, additional flying hours, fuel and other operational expenses. It does not represent the total economic cost of the conflict to the United States.

CBO did not project a fixed $3 billion monthly cost. Instead, it estimated that another month of fighting at the relatively lower intensity seen in May and June would cost about $2 billion, while a month resembling the more intense fighting in July would cost about $3 billion. Costs could climb higher if the conflict escalates again.

The budget office also warned that the conflict has drawn down important U.S. munitions inventories, particularly missile interceptors and long-range precision weapons. Replenishing some of those stocks could take years. That creates a strategic cost beyond the immediate dollar figure because weapons used in the Middle East are weapons temporarily unavailable for other contingencies.

The $38 billion estimate also has limitations. CBO said the Defense Department did not provide the information the budget office requested, forcing analysts to rely on government databases and public reporting. The estimate does not include all costs borne by other federal agencies, future borrowing costs or the broader economic impact of higher energy prices and disrupted trade. The agency said the conflict is likely to add to inflation in early 2027.

The war began on February 28, when the United States and Israel launched strikes on Iran in what Washington called Operation Epic Fury. Iran responded with attacks on Israel and U.S. facilities across the region. The conflict quickly expanded beyond the original strikes, with fighting affecting shipping, energy infrastructure and U.S. bases in the Gulf.

By June, the Trump administration was pursuing a diplomatic pause. U.S. and Iranian officials reached a 14-point memorandum of understanding designed to stop military operations, reopen the Strait of Hormuz and create a 60-day period for negotiating a broader settlement. Vance played a prominent role in the diplomacy, and the agreement was presented at the time as the most significant attempt to halt the war since it began.

The June document was not kept entirely secret. U.S. officials read the 14 points to reporters, the White House sent the text to Congress, and Iran later released a version that matched the American readout. The framework included commitments concerning a halt to military operations, commercial passage through Hormuz, sanctions relief and future negotiations over Iran's nuclear program.

What the agreement did not do was resolve the hardest disputes. It deferred major questions about Iran's nuclear stockpile and the long-term security arrangement to later negotiations. Those talks failed to produce a final deal. In early July, hostilities resumed, and Trump publicly declared the interim agreement “over.” Iran and the United States blamed each other for violations and renewed military pressure around the strait.

That history matters because it complicates any suggestion that the current war can move smoothly into a final phase simply because the intensity of U.S. attacks has declined. Washington and Tehran already reached one framework intended to end the war, and that arrangement unraveled within weeks. Any new diplomatic process would have to address the same unresolved issues while overcoming even deeper mistrust.

Trump nevertheless has repeatedly expressed confidence that the conflict is approaching an end. On September 9, he told reporters, “I think war is going to end immediately after the election because they can't hold out any longer.” He also said oil prices would fall once the conflict ended and left open the possibility of negotiations, though he indicated diplomacy was not the administration's preferred path at that moment.

On September 16, Trump softened the certainty of that prediction, saying he hoped the United States was “towards the end” of the war and suggesting Iran might be willing to negotiate. Reports also indicated that the president was expected to discuss a postwar strategy with Gulf Arab leaders around the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

Vance's remarks fit within that broader administration message: the most intensive phase is over, Iran has been weakened and the conflict may soon look fundamentally different. What remains missing from the public explanation is a set of measurable conditions that would define success. It is not clear how much Iranian military reconstruction the United States would tolerate, what verification regime would govern the nuclear issue or what maritime arrangement would convince commercial carriers that Hormuz is safe again.

There is also a constitutional and political dimension. The president, as commander in chief, directs U.S. military operations, but Congress retains constitutional authorities over war, appropriations and the armed forces. No formal declaration of war against Iran has been enacted. Lawmakers have repeatedly debated whether the administration has sufficient legal authority to continue the conflict without additional congressional authorization.

On September 15, the House voted 220-204 for a war powers resolution seeking to halt hostilities without congressional approval. Seven Republicans joined Democrats in supporting the measure, making it the latest sign of bipartisan discomfort with the duration and cost of the conflict. Earlier efforts had failed to produce a binding end to the war, and any measure reaching Trump's desk could face a veto, but the vote showed that congressional resistance is no longer confined entirely to the opposition party.

The approaching midterm elections add another layer to the administration's public messaging, but the political timetable and the military timetable are not the same thing. Election Day is November 3. Shipping companies, military planners and diplomats must make decisions based on security conditions rather than campaign calendars. Iran's choices, regional actors and unforeseen attacks can also alter the trajectory regardless of what U.S. officials expect today.

The Strait of Hormuz remains the most visible test. It is possible for military officials to say that mine-clearing and escorts have loosened Iran's control while commercial shipping data still show a severely impaired corridor. Both can be true at the same time. Restoring a waterway of this importance requires not only the physical ability to move ships but enough confidence among carriers and insurers for routine traffic to resume.

The recent clash over the U.S. sea drone illustrates how fragile that confidence remains. Even small encounters can raise insurance costs, delay cargoes and trigger fears of a wider confrontation. The same applies to attacks elsewhere in the region, including Houthi strikes and damage to Saudi infrastructure that can threaten alternative energy routes when Hormuz is constrained.

For the administration, the strongest argument for its phase-two framing is that the character of the fighting has undeniably changed since the opening weeks. The United States is not conducting the same tempo of strikes it launched in February and March. A large part of the current effort is maritime, defensive and focused on denying Iran the ability to reconstitute capabilities Washington says it destroyed.

The strongest caution is that lower-intensity war is still war. U.S. forces remain deployed and are still exchanging fire with Iranian forces. The strait remains disrupted. A ceasefire framework already failed. Pentagon costs continue to accumulate, and Congress is still arguing over the legal basis for continued hostilities.

That is why Vance's “much different phase” comment is significant without yet being self-explanatory. It may refer to a diplomatic transition, a sustained containment posture, a reduced U.S. military footprint or another arrangement that has not been announced. The administration has not provided enough detail to distinguish among those possibilities.

For now, the available evidence supports a narrower conclusion. The war has changed since its first month, but it has not ended. Iran's conventional military has been weakened, yet its nuclear status remains contested and difficult to verify. The United States has improved its ability to move ships through parts of Hormuz, yet public traffic remains far below prewar levels. A June agreement temporarily reduced hostilities, yet it collapsed before producing a lasting settlement.

The coming weeks will therefore be measured less by rhetoric than by observable developments: whether commercial traffic rises consistently, whether U.S. and Iranian attacks decline, whether nuclear negotiations resume, whether the administration presents a durable security framework and whether Congress changes the legal or financial boundaries of the campaign.

Vance is telling Americans that the conflict is entering a second stage and may look very different within months. Trump has said he expects the war to end after the midterms and has more recently expressed hope that the end is near. Those are statements of expectation from the administration, not guarantees about what Iran or the region will do next.

At the moment, the clearest facts remain stubbornly concrete: Operation Epic Fury began on February 28; CBO estimates roughly $38 billion in direct Pentagon costs through August 1; another month could cost roughly $2 billion to $3 billion depending on the intensity of combat; and publicly tracked traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains a fraction of its prewar level.

The phrase “much different phase” may ultimately prove to describe a real strategic transition. But until the administration defines the end state - and until conditions in the Gulf begin to match that definition - the United States remains in an active conflict whose military, economic and political consequences are still unfolding.