"TRUMP FACED WITH ANOTHER ROUND OF BETRAYAL: Republicans Turn On Him Over 'War Powers'!"1
Seven Republicans Join Democrats as House Passes Iran War Powers Resolution 220-204
The September vote widened Republican dissent over the nearly seven-month Iran conflict as a new CBO report put direct Pentagon costs at about $38 billion. The measure is now in the Senate, but its legal path is more complicated than a conventional bill or joint resolution.
WASHINGTON - The House of Representatives has again voted to challenge President Donald Trump's continued use of U.S. military force against Iran, this time with seven Republicans joining Democrats to approve a War Powers Resolution by 220-204. The September 15 vote represented the largest Republican defection yet on a House measure seeking to terminate U.S. involvement in the conflict without additional congressional authorization.
The official House roll call shows that H. Con. Res. 93 passed with 220 votes in favor, 204 against and nine members not voting. All Democrats who cast votes supported the resolution, along with Republican Reps. Thomas Massie of Kentucky, Brian Fitzpatrick of Pennsylvania, Warren Davidson of Ohio, Tom Barrett of Michigan, Nancy Mace of South Carolina, Mariannette Miller-Meeks of Iowa and Zach Nunn of Iowa.
Independent Rep. Kevin Kiley of California voted against the measure. Kiley left the Republican Party earlier in 2026 and is listed in the House as an independent, although he has continued to caucus with Republicans during the current Congress for committee and conference purposes.
The resolution was introduced by Rep. Seth Moulton, D-Mass., and had 14 Democratic cosponsors. It directs the president, under Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, to remove U.S. armed forces from hostilities with Iran unless Congress has authorized those hostilities through a declaration of war or other specific statutory authorization. The measure includes an exception for forces needed to respond to an imminent attack, subject to the reporting requirements of the War Powers Resolution.
The vote came more than six months after U.S. and Israeli strikes against Iran began on February 28. Congress has not enacted a declaration of war or a separate authorization for the use of military force against Iran, and that absence of explicit authorization has become the central legal and constitutional argument made by supporters of the resolution.
Moulton and other supporters argue that whatever authority the president possessed to respond to immediate threats cannot support an open-ended military campaign without Congress. They point to Article I of the Constitution, which gives Congress powers over declarations of war, military funding and regulation of the armed forces, as well as the 1973 War Powers Resolution, which was enacted after the Vietnam era to constrain prolonged unilateral presidential military action.
The Trump administration disputes that interpretation. Administration officials have argued that the president retains substantial Article II authority as commander in chief and have also contended that cease-fires or pauses in active exchanges can end or reset the statutory War Powers clock. Critics of that position respond that the statute does not expressly provide for pausing the 60-day period whenever active firing temporarily stops. That dispute remains unresolved between the political branches.
The September vote also occurred on the same day the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office released a detailed estimate of the conflict's costs. CBO estimated that Defense Department combat operations against Iran had cost approximately $38 billion through August 1, 2026, including the replacement of expended munitions and equipment, additional flying hours, operations and higher fuel costs.
CBO projected that continuing operations could add roughly $2 billion to $3 billion per month, depending on the intensity of the fighting. The office cautioned that its estimates carry substantial uncertainty because the Defense Department did not provide all of the information CBO requested and because future costs depend heavily on how the conflict develops.
The budget office also highlighted a military-readiness issue that has become increasingly important in congressional debate. CBO said recent operations have consumed a large share of certain U.S. missile-defense interceptors, estimating that between one-half and two-thirds of the inventory of some interceptor types has been expended since June 2025. Rebuilding those stocks could take at least five years even with higher production rates.
Those findings do not mean the United States has exhausted its entire missile inventory, and descriptions such as "severe missile shortages" can obscure important distinctions among weapon systems. The CBO concern is specifically that inventories of certain high-demand interceptors have been significantly depleted, limiting flexibility for other possible contingencies while replacements are manufactured.
The cost report gave supporters of H. Con. Res. 93 another argument for congressional involvement. Eighteen U.S. service members have been killed during the conflict, according to congressional and news reports, while disruptions involving the Strait of Hormuz and regional energy markets have added an economic dimension to the domestic debate.
The seven Republican votes are notable because the number has grown over the course of the year. Four Republicans - Massie, Fitzpatrick, Davidson and Barrett - backed the first two House Iran War Powers resolutions. In September, Mace, Miller-Meeks and Nunn joined them for the first time.
Miller-Meeks and Nunn had previously voted against similar efforts. Both Iowa Republicans later cited concerns about the duration and costs of the conflict and the need for Congress to exercise its constitutional role. Nunn said he would not support another open-ended war, while Miller-Meeks called for the administration to present Congress and the public with a clearer plan for how the conflict ends.
Their change in position has attracted additional attention because both are seeking reelection in competitive Iowa districts. That electoral context is relevant, but their votes do not by themselves establish a political motive; both lawmakers publicly grounded their decisions in war-powers, military and economic concerns.
The House has now approved three Iran-focused Section 5(c) concurrent resolutions in 2026. The first, H. Con. Res. 86, passed the House 215-208 on June 3, with four Republicans joining Democrats. The Senate later agreed to that concurrent resolution by 50-48 on June 23.
A second House resolution, H. Con. Res. 89, passed 214-208 on July 23, again with four Republican supporters. The latest measure, H. Con. Res. 93, increased Republican support from four members to seven and passed by a larger six-vote margin.
The earlier June measure is important because it demonstrates that a War Powers concurrent resolution can win majority support in both chambers and still fail to produce an immediate end to military operations. The reason involves a longstanding constitutional problem built into Section 5(c) of the 1973 law.
A concurrent resolution is not the same as a bill or joint resolution. Under normal congressional procedure, concurrent resolutions approved by both chambers are not presented to the president for signature or veto and do not become statutory law. The House itself describes concurrent resolutions as measures that are not sent to the president for action.
Section 5(c) nevertheless says that U.S. forces engaged in unauthorized hostilities must be removed if Congress directs withdrawal by concurrent resolution. The Congressional Research Service has explained that this mechanism became constitutionally doubtful after the Supreme Court's 1983 decision in INS v. Chadha, which rejected legislative-veto arrangements that altered executive legal rights without presentment to the president.
That means the claim that H. Con. Res. 93 would go to Trump's desk for a possible veto is incorrect. If the Senate agrees to the same concurrent resolution, it would not be presented to the president. Instead, the dispute would turn on the contested legal force of Section 5(c), the executive branch's response and Congress's other constitutional tools, including appropriations and separately enacted legislation.
Congress can also use a bill or joint resolution to try to compel withdrawal. Unlike a concurrent resolution, a joint resolution would be presented to the president and could be vetoed, with a two-thirds vote in both chambers required to override a veto. CRS notes that Congress created expedited procedures for such legislation after the Chadha decision even while retaining the older Section 5(c) concurrent-resolution process.
As of September 21, 2026, the latest House measure has not completed that next step. Government Publishing Office records show that H. Con. Res. 93 was received in the Senate on September 16 and referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. No final Senate vote on the resolution has yet been recorded.
The administration has continued to defend its handling of the Iran conflict and has rejected congressional claims that current operations are unlawful. The White House has said it has kept lawmakers informed, while supporters of the administration argue that the president must retain operational flexibility to protect U.S. forces, allies and national-security interests.
Supporters of H. Con. Res. 93 make a different institutional argument: that a campaign lasting many months, costing tens of billions of dollars and producing continuing U.S. casualties should require an affirmative decision by Congress rather than rely indefinitely on executive authority.
The vote therefore reflects a real but still limited widening of Republican opposition to the current course. Seven Republicans broke with the majority of their party, but more than 200 House members opposed the resolution, and the administration continues to reject the central legal premise advanced by its supporters.
The most immediate significance of the September 15 vote is not that it automatically ended the conflict - it did not - but that the House has now registered opposition for a third time, with a larger group of Republicans joining Democrats as the human, budgetary and military-readiness costs become more visible.
For now, the factual picture is clear: the House passed H. Con. Res. 93 by 220-204; seven Republicans supported it; CBO has put direct Pentagon costs at roughly $38 billion through August 1; and the resolution is pending in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. What remains disputed is the extent of presidential war-making authority and whether Congress will use a legally enforceable mechanism to compel a change in U.S. military operations.
"🚨 BRANSON'S SCATHING ATTACK! — HE BLASTS TRUMP OVER PUTIN TIES AND URGES EUROPE TO STAND FIRM!"
British billionaire Sir Richard Branson has launched a fierce public attack on Donald Trump, accusing the U.S. administration of appeasing dictators and putting personal preferences ahead of American and allied interests.
The Virgin Group founder made his criticism in a LinkedIn post published this week, questioning why Trump appeared so willing to accommodate Russian President Vladimir Putin while Ukraine continues to face Russia’s invasion.
Branson described the administration as an “appeaser to autocrats and dictators,” arguing that its approach could weaken confidence among America’s traditional allies and undermine the interests of democratic nations.
He also raised a pointed question about the president’s relationship with Putin, asking why Trump seemed to flatter the Russian leader despite the continuing war and widespread international concern over Moscow’s actions.
The remarks come amid renewed controversy over a reported agreement involving Russian diesel supplies and a temporary easing of U.S. sanctions on Russian energy exports.
Trump has defended the arrangement as beneficial to fuel markets, while critics argue that allowing Russian energy revenues to flow could indirectly help Moscow sustain its war effort.
Branson called the deal deeply hypocritical, pointing to the contrast between Washington’s previous willingness to penalize countries purchasing Russian energy and its own decision to ease restrictions.
His criticism extended beyond energy policy. He also condemned Trump’s public attacks on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, describing the administration’s treatment of Ukraine as a betrayal during a period of war and suffering.
The billionaire’s intervention follows mounting concern in Kyiv and across Europe about the durability of American support for Ukraine, particularly as diplomatic efforts have struggled to produce a lasting settlement.
Branson also expressed alarm about reports involving restrictions on Starshield services used by Ukraine, a technology issue that has raised questions about the country’s access to crucial battlefield communications.
Some of Branson’s claims about the consequences of satellite-service restrictions have not been independently confirmed, and the details of decisions involving military communications remain disputed.
He urged European leaders to respond more decisively, arguing that the continent cannot simply wait for Washington to determine the future of Ukraine’s security and its broader relationship with Russia.
His proposed response reportedly included considering the use of frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine and supplying more advanced weapons, measures that would intensify the confrontation with Moscow.
The comments place Branson among a relatively small group of prominent business leaders willing to criticize Trump directly over foreign policy, despite the political and commercial sensitivities surrounding such interventions.
Branson has previously spoken out in support of Ukraine and criticized approaches that he believes would pressure Kyiv into accepting an unfavorable peace agreement with Russia.
The latest dispute also comes at a politically sensitive moment in the United States, with congressional midterm elections approaching and foreign policy increasingly intertwined with domestic debates over leadership and national priorities.
Supporters of Trump’s approach may argue that direct engagement with Moscow and energy-market flexibility can serve American interests, even when such policies provoke disagreement among allies.
Critics counter that concessions to Russia risk weakening deterrence and sending an unsettling message to countries relying on the United States for diplomatic, economic and military support.
The disagreement reflects a broader debate over whether negotiations and economic pragmatism can help end the war—or whether they could give Moscow additional leverage without securing meaningful concessions.
For Ukraine, the stakes remain immediate: continued military pressure, uncertainty over international support and the search for a settlement that preserves its sovereignty remain central concerns.
Branson’s intervention adds another prominent voice to the dispute, challenging the White House’s handling of Russia and demanding a stronger response from Europe as the conflict continues.
