"WHO IS TO BLAME? Are Trump’s Policies Ruining America’s Standing in the World?"
Is Trump Damaging America's Global Reputation — or Making the World Take It More Seriously?
Donald Trump's second presidency is producing two seemingly contradictory results abroad. By conventional measures of international reputation, the United States has become less popular in many countries and confidence in Trump is low across much of the world. At the same time, NATO allies are spending far more on defense, governments are responding to U.S. tariff and security pressure, and Washington retains extraordinary military and economic leverage. Those facts support neither the simple claim that Trump has made America stronger everywhere nor the opposite claim that lower foreign approval automatically means American power has collapsed. The more accurate picture is that U.S. soft power has weakened while hard power and coercive leverage remain formidable. The unresolved question is whether pressure is producing stronger long-term partnerships — or stronger allies that increasingly want to depend less on Washington.
1. The Reputation Numbers Are Difficult for Trump
The strongest evidence for critics comes from Pew Research Center's 2026 Global Attitudes Survey. Pew interviewed 42,151 adults in 36 countries between February 8 and May 13, 2026.
Across those countries, a median of only 23 percent said they had confidence in Trump to do the right thing regarding world affairs. His ratings were lower than those of Emmanuel Macron, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin among the leaders included in the comparison; only Benjamin Netanyahu received lower median confidence.
Views of the United States itself were also weak. Across the 36 countries, a median of 37 percent expressed a favorable view of the U.S., while 57 percent viewed it unfavorably. Favorability fell significantly in 15 of the 24 countries where Pew had comparable data from the previous year.
2. The Decline Is Broad, Not Confined to One Region
Pew reported double-digit declines in favorable views of the United States in Indonesia, Italy, Nigeria, South Africa, South Korea and Turkey. In several long-running survey countries, including Canada, France, Germany, Italy, South Africa, South Korea and the United Kingdom, positive ratings of the U.S. were at or near historic lows.
The pattern matters because a country's reputation abroad can affect diplomatic flexibility. Governments do not make policy solely according to public opinion, but elected leaders in allied democracies operate inside political environments where cooperation with an unpopular United States can carry domestic costs.
This is the clearest area where Trump's second term has damaged America's international position: not necessarily in the raw ability to compel outcomes, but in the reservoir of goodwill that makes cooperation easier.
3. Many Foreign Publics Now Question America's Contribution to Stability
Pew also asked a more substantive question than whether respondents simply liked the United States. Across the countries surveyed, a median of 35 percent said the U.S. contributes a great deal or a fair amount to peace and stability around the world. A median of 63 percent said it does not.
In 19 of 22 countries with comparable data from 2023, the share saying America contributes to global peace and stability had fallen. The decline was at least 30 percentage points in Sweden, the Netherlands, Poland, Canada and Australia.
That finding suggests the issue extends beyond Trump's personal style. Large numbers of people abroad are questioning the broader role Washington is playing in the international system.
4. Trump Is Becoming More Closely Identified With the American Brand
An August 2026 Pew analysis found that views of the United States and confidence in its president are now much more closely correlated than they were during Joe Biden's presidency or during Trump's first term.
In every one of the 36 countries surveyed, people who had confidence in Trump were more likely to view the United States favorably, while those who lacked confidence in him were more likely to view the country negatively.
That does not prove Trump alone caused every decline in U.S. standing. Wars, trade conflicts, regional politics and local ideology also shape opinion. But it does mean that foreign publics increasingly treat Trump himself as part of what America represents.
5. Gallup Points in the Same Direction
Gallup's global polling also shows a decline in approval of U.S. leadership. Its 2025 worldwide data, released in April 2026, found median approval of U.S. leadership at 31 percent, down from 39 percent in 2024.
Disapproval of U.S. leadership rose to a record 48 percent. China, meanwhile, registered 36 percent approval — five points above the United States and the widest advantage Gallup has recorded for China in nearly two decades.
The comparison should not be overstated. Neither Washington nor Beijing enjoyed broad global approval, and Gallup's figures largely measure views collected during 2025 rather than the full set of developments that occurred in 2026.
Still, Pew and Gallup point in the same general direction: by conventional measures of reputation and leadership approval, America's international image has weakened.
6. Reputation Is Not the Same Thing as Power
This is where the strongest argument for Trump's foreign policy begins. States are not judged only by whether foreign publics approve of them. Military capability, economic size, alliance networks, financial power, technological leadership and the ability to impose costs all matter.
A country can be unpopular and still possess enormous leverage. Conversely, a highly respected country may lack the capacity to compel outcomes when another government refuses to cooperate.
Trump's supporters therefore use a different scorecard. They ask whether allies spend more, whether adversaries change behavior under pressure, whether trade partners make concessions and whether the United States extracts terms Washington considers more favorable.
By that measure, the record is more mixed — and in some cases more favorable to Trump.
7. NATO Is the Strongest Example for Trump's Supporters
At the 2025 NATO summit in The Hague, alliance members agreed to a historic new defense-investment commitment: 5 percent of GDP annually by 2035.
The framework requires at least 3.5 percent of GDP for core military requirements and allows another 1.5 percent for broader defense and security-related investments such as critical infrastructure, resilience, networks and industrial capacity.
NATO reported that European allies and Canada increased combined defense expenditure by nearly 20 percent in real terms in 2025 compared with 2024. By 2026, every ally had reached or exceeded the alliance's previous 2 percent benchmark.
Secretary General Mark Rutte explicitly said Trump had made clear that the United States expected European allies and Canada to contribute more and that they were doing exactly that.
8. But Trump Does Not Deserve Sole Credit for Europe's Rearmament
It would be too simple, however, to say NATO's spending surge exists only because Trump demanded it. NATO's own summit declaration identifies Russia's long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security, terrorism and the broader deterioration in the security environment as central reasons for the spending increase.
Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine had already pushed European governments toward much higher defense budgets before Trump's return to office. The war in the Middle East and fears about U.S. reliability have added additional pressure.
The fairest conclusion is that Trump's confrontational burden-sharing campaign accelerated and intensified a trend that was already being driven by genuine security threats.
9. Higher Allied Spending Can Be Both a Trump Success and a Warning Sign
The NATO example illustrates the central paradox. If allies field stronger militaries and continue coordinating closely with Washington, the United States benefits from a more balanced alliance with greater European capability.
But some European governments are also investing more because they worry that American support may be less predictable. European policy debates increasingly use terms such as strategic autonomy, defense sovereignty and reduced dependence on U.S. capabilities.
Those outcomes are not mutually exclusive. Trump's pressure can produce exactly the spending increase he wants while simultaneously encouraging allies to prepare for a future in which they cannot assume Washington will always provide the same level of support.
Whether that ultimately strengthens or weakens American influence depends on what those stronger allies do with their new independence.
10. Trade Shows the Same Contradiction
Trump's economic diplomacy relies heavily on tariffs, threats and access to the U.S. market. The approach can generate leverage because the American economy remains one of the most important markets in the world.
But it can also generate retaliation from countries that once expected trade disputes with Washington to remain inside more predictable institutional channels.
Canada's retaliatory tariffs are a current example. On September 8, 2026, Canada allowed new tariffs ranging from 15 to 50 percent to take effect on roughly $20 billion of U.S. goods after negotiations with Washington stalled.
The Trump administration responded with further restrictions and threats, including a warning that Canadian aircraft maker Bombardier could lose access to the U.S. market unless Washington's demands were met.
11. Pressure on Canada Demonstrates Leverage — and Its Political Costs
Supporters see the Canada dispute as evidence that the United States can use access to its market as a bargaining weapon. Critics see a historically close ally searching for ways to reduce dependence on the United States.
Prime Minister Mark Carney has explicitly argued that Canada should diversify trade away from its heavy reliance on the American market. The trade war has also generated political backlash inside the United States: Republican senators from Kansas publicly intervened after Trump's Bombardier threat raised concern about thousands of American aerospace jobs.
That episode captures the risk of coercive trade policy. Leverage can force negotiations, but it can also create supply-chain disruption, domestic political resistance and incentives for partners to build alternatives.
12. The G20 Dispute Shows That Some U.S. Economic Arguments Still Attract Broad Support
Trump's international economic agenda is not uniformly isolated. At the September 2026 G20 finance meeting, all members except China supported language calling for action against non-market policies that contribute to distorted trade and global imbalances.
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent used the meeting to argue that China's export-heavy model and industrial subsidies create unsustainable distortions. China rejected the language and the meeting ended with a chair's summary rather than a fully agreed communique.
The episode does not mean the G20 has embraced Trump's entire tariff strategy. Several countries continue to criticize U.S. tariffs and protectionism. It does show that Washington can still build broad support around specific concerns, especially complaints about Chinese state-directed economic policy.
13. Turkey Illustrates the Hedge, Not the Collapse of Alliances
Turkey offers another useful example of how allies are diversifying without necessarily abandoning the United States. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said in September that Turkey wants deeper participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the China- and Russia-led grouping that also includes India, Iran and other Eurasian states.
At the same time, Erdogan insisted that closer ties with Russia and China do not mean turning Turkey's back on the West. Turkey remains a NATO member and continues to maintain significant strategic, military and economic relations with the alliance.
That is more representative of the emerging order than a simple claim that U.S. alliances are collapsing. Many countries want relationships with Washington while also expanding room to cooperate with Beijing, Moscow or regional blocs.
14. Soft Power Makes Leadership Cheaper
The strongest case for caring about reputation is not sentimental. Soft power can reduce the cost of getting other governments to cooperate.
When allies trust American commitments and view U.S. leadership as legitimate, Washington may need fewer threats, tariffs, side payments or coercive measures to assemble coalitions.
Universities, culture, technology, institutions, diplomacy and the perception that the United States takes allies' interests seriously all contribute to that form of influence.
A decline in soft power does not erase aircraft carriers, sanctions power or the size of the U.S. market. It can make those harder instruments necessary more often.
15. Hard Power Can Produce Compliance Without Producing Loyalty
Trump's strategy relies much more heavily on the second form of power: explicit bargaining pressure backed by the willingness to impose economic or military costs.
That can produce real results. Governments that believe Washington may actually impose tariffs, withdraw support or demand higher spending have reason to adjust their behavior quickly.
But compliance is not the same thing as loyalty. A government may meet a U.S. demand today while simultaneously investing in alternative trade routes, defense capabilities, payment systems or diplomatic partnerships so that the same pressure is less effective next time.
The long-term success of Trumpism abroad therefore depends not only on whether pressure works once, but on whether repeated pressure increases or erodes the durability of U.S. influence.
16. America's Global Position Is Still Structurally Powerful
Despite the reputational decline, the United States remains exceptionally difficult to replace. It has the world's most extensive alliance network, unmatched global military logistics, the dominant reserve currency, enormous capital markets, leading technology companies and one of the world's largest consumer markets.
European defense remains deeply dependent on American weapons, intelligence, logistics and strategic enablers. Gulf security still relies heavily on U.S. capabilities. The dollar remains central to global finance. Countries seeking to hedge against Washington often do so without severing their American ties.
For that reason, a decline in favorability should not be confused with an immediate collapse of American power.
17. The Long-Term Risk Is Substitution
The deeper risk appears only over time. If allies conclude that Washington is repeatedly unpredictable or coercive, they may invest in substitutes: European defense industries, non-dollar payment channels, new trade agreements, domestic technology, regional security groupings or closer ties with China.
Some of those changes may actually serve American interests by producing more capable allies. Others could reduce U.S. leverage by giving partners credible alternatives.
This is why the full effect of Trump's strategy cannot be measured solely by today's concession or today's opinion poll.
18. What Can Be Said With Confidence
International opinion of Trump is weak. Pew's 2026 survey found a median of 23 percent confidence in him across 36 countries, while a median of 37 percent viewed the United States favorably and 57 percent unfavorably.
A median of only 35 percent said the United States contributes to global peace and stability, compared with 63 percent who said it does not.
Gallup's 2025 global data likewise showed U.S. leadership approval falling to 31 percent, with China at 36 percent. Those figures predate some major 2026 events but reinforce the direction seen in Pew.
Pew's August 2026 analysis found that international views of the United States are now more closely linked to views of Trump personally than during Biden's presidency or Trump's first term.
At the same time, NATO allies agreed in 2025 to a 5 percent-of-GDP defense and security investment target by 2035, and European allies plus Canada increased combined defense spending by nearly 20 percent in real terms during 2025.
Trump's pressure is one important factor in that burden-sharing shift, but Russia's war against Ukraine and the broader deterioration in European security are also major causes.
Canada's September 8 retaliatory tariffs and the Bombardier dispute show that coercive trade policy can generate both bargaining pressure and backlash among allies and U.S. domestic constituencies.
The September G20 finance meeting showed that nearly every member except China was willing to support language addressing non-market trade distortions, even though those same governments do not necessarily support Trump's full tariff agenda.
Turkey's pursuit of closer ties with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation while remaining committed to NATO illustrates the broader trend: many states are hedging rather than choosing one bloc.
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The strongest conclusion is therefore a paradox. Trump's second presidency has weakened America's reputation and soft power in much of the world, but it has not made the United States irrelevant or powerless. In several areas, U.S. pressure has produced measurable changes in allied behavior.
The unresolved test is whether those changes make Washington's partners more capable and more durable allies — or more capable partners that increasingly organize themselves to operate without American leadership. That distinction will determine whether Trump's foreign policy ultimately traded popularity for strength, or traded long-term influence for short-term leverage.
